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Abstract 
Despite attempts to paper over the dispute, political scientists in the pluralist tra­
dition disagree sharply with public and social choice theorists about the importance of 
institutions and with W illiam Riker in particular who argues in Liberalism against Pop­
ulism that the liberal institutions of indirect democracy ought to be preferred to those of 
populist democracy. This essay reconsiders this dispute in light of two ideas unavailable 
to Riker at the time. The first, offered by Russell Hardin, is that constitutions can more 
usefully be conceptualized as coordinating devices as opposed to social contracts. The 
importance of this idea is that it allows for a more theoretically satisfying view of the way 
that constitutions become self-enforcing. The second idea, which derives from the various 
applications of concepts such as the uncoveted set, argues that although institutions such 
as the direct election of president are subject to the usual inabilities that concern social 
choice theorists, those instabilities do not imply that "anything can happen" - instead, 
final outcomes will be constrained, where the severity of those constraints depend on 
institutional details. We maintain that these ideas strengthen Riker's argument about 
the importance of such constitutional devices as the separation of powers, bicameralism, 
the executive veto, and scheduled elections, as well as the view that federalism is an 
important component of the institutions that stabilize the American political system. 
We conclude with the proposition that the American Civil War should not be regarded 
as a constitutional failure, but rather as a success. 
Constitutional Stability 
To contrive some Method for the Colonies to glide insensibly, from under the old 
Government, into a peaceable and contented submission to new ones [is] the most 
difficult and dangerous Part of the Business Americans have to do in this mighty 
contest. (John Adams) 
In framing a government which is to be administered by men over men, the great 
difficulty lies in this: You must first enable the government to controul the governed; 
and in the next place, oblige it to controul itself. (James Madison) 
This radical error .. .  as regarding the numerical as the only majority, has contributed 
more than any other cause to prevent the formation of popular constitutional 
government, and to destroy them even when they have formed. (John C. Calhoun)1 
! .  Introduction 
Although the literature on constitutions and democratic politics is voluminous, research grounded 
in a well developed framework of scientific discourse that serves as a practical guide to the 
construction of a stable constitutional democracy is virtually nonexistent. There are notable 
exceptions, the most important being The Federalist and the other parts of the debate surrounding 
the ratification of the United States Constitution. Insofar as the contemporary literature is concerned, 
perhaps the two most evident exceptions are Dahl's (1956) Preface to Democratic Theory and Riker's 
(1982) Liberalism against Populism. The failure of political science to offer a more extensive 
literature is unfortunate since we are living in a time when democratic governments have achieved 
unprecedented international legitimacy. And limiting our attention to Dahl and Riker further 
compounds the problem: Although we can find areas of agreement in their initial suppositions, they 
posit diametrically opposite preconditions for a stable political system and reach different conclusions 
about the role of constitutional structure in facilitating that stability. 
Riker bases his analysis on the research of social choice theorists such as Arrow ( 1963), Plott 
( 1967), Davis and Hinich ( 1966), McKelvey (1976), and Schofield (1 978). This research reveals two 
1 The quote by Adams is taken from Gordon S. Wood, The Creation of the American Republic,
Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1969, p. 1 3 1 .  All quotations from The Federalist are 
from The Federalist Papers, Garry Wills, ed., Toronto: Bantam Books, 1982. This particular quote 
is from paper #51 ,  p, 262. All quotations from Calhoun are taken from John C. Calhoun, A 
Disquisition on Government ( 1 853), C. Gordon Post, ed. Indianapolis: Bobbs Merrill, 1953. This 
particular quote is from page 24. 
things. First, coherence (in the form of a well-defined social preference order over feasible policy 
outcomes) in majoritarian processes without impediments to direct citizen control of policy requires 
a nearly-impossible-to-achieve balance of citizen preferences on salient issues, sufficient uniformity 
of tastes and perceptions such that preferences on all issues (potential or otherwise) can be mapped 
to a single "ideological" dimension, or the existence of a unique salient issue. Second, democratic 
procedures such as two candidate elections and committee voting are arbitrary in the sense that 
outcomes and the identities of winners and losers depend on procedural details, including the order 
with which election candidates announce their campaign platforms, the order with which alternatives 
are considered in a legislative voting agenda, the identities of persons who have access to an agenda, 
and the list of feasible policy alternatives. 
From these results Riker constructs the argument that not only is populist political ideology built 
on sand, but that populist institutions that allow citizens direct control over policy are dangerous, 
because they exacerbate the inherent instability of democratic processes and facilitate the rise of 
demagogic leaders who profess to represent a nonexistent "popular will." Rather than seeking to 
transform individual preferences directly into social policy, democratic institutions ought merely to 
give citizens the opportunity to replace one set of leaders with another, with the understanding that 
the relationship between individual preferences and public policy will be mediated by institutional 
detail and the skill of political participants. Thus, the extent to which constitutional structures limit 
direct citizen control of policy without wholly negating the opportunity for citizens to replace 
political leaders whose performance is deemed unsatisfactory determines to a significant degree 
whether the political system itself is stable. Echoing Calhoun's warning that 
The numerical majority, perhaps, should usually be one of the elements of a constitutional 
democracy; but to make it the sole element, in order to perfect the constitution and make the 
government more popular, is one of the greatest and most fatal of political errors (ibid: 35), 
Riker (1982) concludes that "the fundamental method to preserve liberty is to preserve ardently our 
traditional constitutional restraints (p. 252)." 
In contrast, pluralists such as Dahl, Truman (1951 ), Bentley ( 1908), Lipset ( 1 963), Lijphart (1977), 
and Schattschneider ( 1960), although they make little direct reference to social choice theory - ­
indeed, that theory did not exist when much of pluralist theory was first formulated -- evaluate 
differently those preferences that occasion instability and "incoherence," Stability defined in terms 
of the durability of political institutions requires the instability that social choice theory describes, 
because this latter form of instability ensures that there are no permanent winners and no permanent 
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losers in society. The absence of permanent winners and losers, rather than coherence in social 
preferences and outcomes, is the more important objective, and the ultimate source of instability in 
social choice - - a complex nexus of individual preferences that do not admit of wholly determinate 
outcomes -- is deemed necessary and perhaps even sufficient for a stable democracy. 
In searching for the sources of stability in democratic systems, the pluralist is led to focus on the 
ability of citizens to participate in politics via a variety of organizations (parties, interest groups, trade 
unions, firms, industrial associations, political clubs) that are autonomous of the state but that allow 
for complex modes of political action and interaction (Dahl 1982). Constitutional provisions influence 
the form of some of these organizations (for example, the number and character of political parties), 
but this influence is not critical to the political system's ultimate survivability. So, in sharp contrast 
to Riker, Dahl ( 1956) asserts that "constitutional rules are not crucial, independent factors in 
maintaining democracy .. . Constitutional rules are mainly significant because they help to determine 
what particular groups are to be given advantages or handicaps in the political struggle" (p. 1 34). 
Moreover, "to assume that this country remained democratic because of its Constitution seems to me 
an obvious reversal of the relation; it is much more plausible to suppose that the Constitution has 
remained because our society is essentially democratic (p. 143)." 
Part of the disagreement between social choice theorists and pluralists derives from differences 
in definitions of stability. However, even a resolution of this definitional matter does not allow us 
to escape from the fact that both schools of thought evaluate "good" political systems by different 
criteria. Social choice theorists attach pejorative labels to the instabilities they uncover (discordant, 
anarchic, arbitrary, unpredictable, incoherent, inconsistent, chaotic) and devote considerable effort 
at learning how these instabilities can be avoided either by the construction of alternative institutional 
structures or by restricting individual preferences. In contrast, pluralists delight in the discovery of 
such instability or the preferences that occasion it. 
Miller ( 1983), surveying this matter, concludes that the social choice theorist's desire to maximize 
coherence qua transitivity in social decisions ought to be set aside so as to ensure meeting the more 
general goal of political stability. However, merely eschewing the theorist's admittedly myopic goal 
does not tell us how to best ensure a stable democracy. The particular difficulty is that neither Riker 
nor pluralists present complete arguments. In searching for the sources of stability, Riker advocates 
constitutional provisions that limit citizen control of policy but that simultaneously allow replacement 
of political leaders through voting -- a multi-camera! versus a unicameral legislature, a separation 
of powers, federalism, an independent judiciary, and, of course, limited tenure and regular elections. 
However, there are questions that Riker fails to address satisfactorily, and three in particular concern 
us: 
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I. What is the ultimate source of stability of liberal, constitutionally mandated institutions -­
what are the mechanisms for ensuring that these institutions do not merely inherit the 
property of instability that adhere to policy outcomes? 
2. Is it inevitable that populist institutions cannot preclude wholly unpredictable outcomes?
3. What of the fact that social choice theory also tells that the identities of victorious candidates
produced by liberal democratic institutions need not be any more "coherent" than those
produced by populist institutions?
Pluralists, on the other hand, can be accused of giving too little attention to the role of institutions. 
Although stability may require that there not be any permanent losers (or at least, no "significant" 
number of them), denying any critical role for constitutions fails to recognize that preferences for 
public policy and the ways in which society divides on issues are not independent of those institutions. 
A preference for supply of some service at the state versus the federal level, for example, is not 
infrequently determined by a guess as to the distributive consequences of these two alternatives, 
which are determined by how state versus national bureaucracies and legislatures act, which is 
determined in turn by those constitutional provisions dictating the jurisdictions of state and federal 
courts and the structure of representation. Indeed, to the extent that constitutions allow for the 
definition and defense of property rights, then constitutional definitions of those rights dictate not 
only which groups are winning and which are losing, but also the incentives for groups to act 
politically. As Mueller (1991:  325) succinctly argues, "One, if not the most important, lesson public 
choice teaches is that institutions do matter," 
This essay argues that although social choice theorists are too preoccupied with a limited and 
oftentimes uninteresting forms of stability, Riker infers the correct lesson from the social choice 
literature - - a properly designed constitutional order that avoids populism ensures that stability is 
maintained in those circumstances when pluralist preferences take a form that is destructive of the 
political order -- most notably, when those preferences concern the redistribution of wealth and the 
definition of rights. 
2. Self-Enforcing Constitutions 
Before proceeding, we must first define a constitution, its role, and the way it achieves that role. 
At one level of abstraction we can say that because "there are both conditions that facilitate mutually 
productive relationships and those that yield mutually destructive relationships," constitutions 
establish relationships that "facilitate the one and constrain the other by constituting order in human 
societies" (Ostrom 1 987: 48). At another level we can say simply that a constitution is a set of rules 
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for political action. Although much of politics is directed by informal rules, we also require rules that 
identify the political state and that specify its legitimate actions. 
These descriptions, though, tell us little about how a constitution is maintained and about how it 
differs from, say, statutory law. More abstractly, then, note that constitutions are commonly 
conceptualized as contracts whereby people establish authorities to guide the reallocation of wealth 
and to resolve those social inefficiencies occasioned by externalities and public goods (c.f., Brennan 
and Buchanan 1985). But there are difficulties associated with this view, the most important being 
that it does not specify how that contract is enforced. Indeed, if we accept the argument that 
sovereignty under a democratic constitution resides in the people, then it is evident that any such 
constitution must be self-enforcing. As Madison well understood, 
A mere demarcation on parchment of the constitutional limits of the several departments is not 
a sufficient guard against those enrochments which lead to a tyrannical concentration of all the 
powers of government in the same hands (ibid, #48: 254). 
or as Calhoun subsequently reaffirmed, 
it is a great mistake to suppose that the mere insertion of provisions [in a written constitution} 
to restrict and limit the powers of the government .. .  will be sufficient to prevent the major and 
dominant party from abusing its powers (ibid: 25). 
However, if contracts ensure that people do things that they would not otherwise do, it is difficult 
to isolate the source of self-enforcement. Is it enforced with yet a second contract, that is enforced 
with a third, and so on? Is it enforced from within, by establishing the police, the courts, and the 
military? Or must it be enforced by force to be administered by an oligarchy that stands removed 
from constitutional restrictions? The answer to the first question is obviously "No," the second 
question merely pushes the problem back a step so that we must ask "how are the provisions enforcing 
those enforcement mechanisms enforced?" and we need not answer the third question since we are 
concerned only with democratic constitutions. 
To see this problem differently, consider the two-person Prisoners' Dilemma, which provides the 
simplest illustration of the state's essential role of regulating externalities and which models the 
problems that were foremost on the minds of the Framers of the United States Constitution -­
national defense, interstate commerce, and currency reform. This dilemma, played once, can be 
resolved and an efficient outcome achieved only if both persons are coerced by some exogenous force 
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to cooperate (Olson 1965, Hardin 1982), and the essence of the "constitutional contract" is the creation 
of this force. If the players contract beforehand to establish a third "player" (the state) who 
administers selective fines for non-cooperation and if the fines are sufficiently great, then an 
efficient outcome prevails -- both players cooperate, no fines are collected, and the only loss is the 
fee that the state charges for its services. But the incentives of the third player, the state, must be 
designed carefully to ensure that it does not act to the detriment of one or both of the original players. 
Because the incentives of the two contracting players remain essentially unchanged, each must be 
concerned that the other does not collude with the state to "expropriate" from it. Thus, the state must 
be designed so that its rewards are contingent on the realization of full cooperation, and the players 
must monitor the state's actions and stand ready to replace it. 
This traditional justification of the democratic state seems unexceptional. However, notice that 
what "solves" the dilemma is an abrogation of sovereignty by the original contracting players, for 
nnless sovereignty passes to the hands of the state, one or both persons can defect from the contract 
and leave the dilemma unresolved. Thus, much of the debate in the United States over this 
contractarian view revolves around the issue of whether the Supreme Court is the ultimate enforcer -
- the philosopher king of American democracy or whether, as Wagner (1987: 1 1 7) argues, "within a 
republican system of government .. .  the legislature is supreme, and the constitution will, by and large, 
be what the legislature wants it to be." 
Neither answer is descriptively or normatively satisfactory. Landes and Posner ( 1975)  debunk the 
Supreme Court as philosopher king, and in response to Wagner, we can ask rhetorically why any 
legislator is defeated for reelection or, indeed, why they tolerate the necessity of running for 
reelection in the first place. And normatively, abrogating sovereignty is at odds with the democratic 
requirement that sovereignty reside in the citizenry. As James Wilson argued, echoing the position 
of others, 
In all governments, whatever their form. however they may be construed, there must be a power 
established from which there is no appeal, and which is therefore called absolute, supreme, and 
uncontrollable . . .  [and a democratic state, that supreme power] resides with the people . . . .  they 
have not parted with it; they have only dispensed such portions of power as were conceived 
necessary for the public we/fare.2
2 As quotes in Wood, passim, 530. 
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Thus, as Tullock ( 1987: 3 17-8) asserts, "The view that the government can be bound by specific 
provisions is naive. Something must enforce those provisions, and whatever enforces them is itself 
unbounded ... This problem of the self-enforcing constitution has so far evaded solution." 
The missing element in our analysis that resolves the enforcement issue is that we have taken too 
narrow a view of the substantive problems with which constitutions deal. The Framers of the United 
States Constitution did not envision solving a defense dilemma or an interstate commerce dilemma 
that would exist only for a few years. They saw these dilemmas as on-going problems of indefinite 
duration that, unresolved, would lead to the eventual disintegration of the Union. Thus, "A 
constitution does not resolve a particular prisoners' dilemma interaction. It regulates a long term 
pattern of interaction" (Hardin 1 989: IOI). Constitutions are not intended to solve a single problem 
that may not exist in the near future; they are formed instead to solve long-term problems and, 
regardless of the facts surrounding constitutional durability in other states, they are designed 
presumably to have long half-lives. 
Returning then to the Prisoners' Dilemma, suppose that instead of being played once, it is played 
repeatedly an indefinite number of times. We know that in this instance there are a great many 
equilibria that resolve the dilemma to each player's satisfaction (Taylor 1976, Axelrod 1984). That 
is, repetition alone and not exogenous enforcement allows us to establish efficient outcomes as 
equilibria. 
Of course, the ease with which we arrived at this "solution" to the type of game that concerned 
the Founders would suggest that there was little justification for establishing a national state and 
abrogating the Articles of Confederation. However, there is another fact with which we must 
contend; although there are equilibria that yield cooperation at every stage and that give no advantage 
to one player or the other, there are yet other equilibria that give asymmetric rewards and there are 
still others that are simply inefficient. 
This multiplicity of equilibria implies that unless both persons coordinate their strategies to a 
mutually agreeable outcome, they cannot preclude the possibility that no mutually beneficial outcome 
will prevail. That is, rather than erect an institution to enforce a contract, the players must instead 
find a mechanism that coordinates their actions in a way that is acceptable to both of them. Suppose, 
then, that in lieu of creating a third party to whom they abrogate their sovereignty, both persons 
simply discuss the matter beforehand and agree to a particular pattern of play -- to a particular 
strategy combination that corresponds to an mutually desired equilibrium (for example, tit-for-tat). 
In this instance there is no necessity for becoming concerned with the problem of defection from this 
temporally extended agreement - - if each believes that the other will abide by it, both persons in fact 
have an incentive to act accordingly. Thus, their agreement is self-enforcing. 
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The "constitution" in our example is not anything that necessarily appears on paper. On the other 
hand, imagine that both persons anticipate playing this same game with others not party to the 
original agreement. At this point a useful tactic is to publicize the terms of their agreement and to 
announce that they intend to abide by similar strategies regardless of the identities of the other 
players. If this proposal is deemed "fair" and profitable by all participants, it seems reasonable to 
suppose that these other persons will also want to affix their names to the agreement and that this 
mode of playing the dilemma and the associated public agreement will assume the same force that we 
attribute to stable and effective constitutions -- indeed, we can even label it as such. Moreover, we 
see here how a "piece of paper," without any abrogation of sovereignty to a monarch or a despot, can 
bind people's actions and solve those dilemmas that rationalize the existence of the state. 
We emphasize that this argument does not depend on the supposition that our hypothetical society 
is concerned only with resolving a prisoners' dilemma - - we do not want to argue about the frequency 
with which such dilemmas arise, whether such dilemmas are resolved only by government 
intervention, or whether governments ought to be concerned only with such dilemmas. Rather, this 
example merely illustrates the fact that countless alternative equilibria characterize nearly any 
ongoing social process, that nearly any outcome corresponds to an equilibrium regardless of its 
properties with respect to efficiency or fairness, and that unless there are mechanisms of 
coordination, there is no guarantee that any equilibrium will be achieved (Fudenburgh and Maskin 
1 986). Those mechanisms can correspond to informal norms or undescribed evolutionary processes; 
but if neither the imperatives of evolution nor culture apply, they must consist of those explicit 
agreements we call constitutions. Thus, theory compels us to concur with Hardin ( I  989: 1 19) that 
Because it is not a contract but a convention, a constitution does not depend for its enforcement 
on external sanctions or bootstrapping commitments founded in nothing but supposed or 
hypothetical agreement. Establishing a constitution is a massive act of coordination that creates 
a convention that depends for its maintenance on its self-generating incentives and 
expectations. 
and with Ostrom's ( 1987: 5 1 )  equivalent observation that, 
If human beings have basic confidence that the conditions of life are organized to facilitate 
the working out of mutually agreeable relationships, they can approach one another in quite 
different ways than if they have to assume that they are always exposed to threats and 
exploitation by others . . .  The task in constituting a political order is how to rig the games of 
life in a way that is fair and grounded in principles of respect and reciprocity ... 
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3. Stable Expectations and Stable Constitutions
The preceding interpretation of a constitution has several advantages. First, it reveals how 
unwritten constitutions can function and how written ones can allow for continued ambiguity (Foley 
1990). Specifically, coordination can be accomplished with both explicit and tacit agreements, 
whereas contracts without coordination require that nearly everything be stated explicitly. Second, 
this interpretation tells us why they are best written without trying to resolve all immediate political 
conflicts, why they ought to be kept simple, and why, once written, their adoption ought to be 
accompanied by a public debate that commits the citizenry to it (c.f., Riker 1 976). The contractarian 
view, on the other hand, leads to constitutions that try to "nail down" every detail and negotiate every 
immediate political conflict, with the consequence that they are unlikely to secure much allegiance 
in public debate and cannot coordinate political action for very long. 
More generally, the particular advantage of this interpretation of a constitution is that it tells us 
how to define an effective constitution. Specifically, to perform its coordinative function, a 
constitution must establish a set of stable and self-generating expectations about peoples' actions. The 
strategy of tit-for-tat "solves" the repeated Prisoners' Dilemma not only if both players intend initially 
to choose this strategy, but also only if each expects the other to do the same. Indeed, this expectation 
must be common knowledge -- each person must expect the other to choose that particular strategy, 
each must believe that the other holds a similar expectation, each must believe that the other believes 
that this is so, and so on. Without such expectations, one person or the other may soon come to 
believe that the interaction is headed toward some other equilibrium, in which case there is no 
guarantee that a mutually agreeable resolution of the dilemma will prevail. 
To the extent that it is in everyone's interest to have some minimal degree of certainty about 
process and outcomes, a constitution that cannot provide a stable and self -fulfilling set of expectations 
cannot long survive. Indeed, as Madison eloquently expressed the matter 
The internal effects of a mutable policy are ... calamitous. It poisons the blessings of liberty 
itself. It will be of little avail to the people that the laws are made by men of their own choice. 
if the laws be so voluminous that they cannot be read. or so incoherent that they cannot be 
understood; if they be repealed or revised before they are promulgated, or undergo such 
incessant changes that no man who knows what the law is to-day can guess what it will be 
tomorrow. Law is defined as a rule of action; but how can that be a rule, which is little known 
and less fixed? (ibid, #62: 3 17)  
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The concept of a self-enforcing constitution, then, leads directly to that of a stable constitution 
and a stable political system. We concur, of course, with the argument that a constitution ought to 
be flexible so as to allow for evolutionary change (Niskanen 1990). However, a stable and effective 
constitution cannot be too flexible. For example, the constitution of the USSR (either its Stalinist or 
1977 versions) gave the appearance of being democratic by establishing not only an "elective" 
legislative branch, but also by identifying a virtual shopping list of individual "rights."3 Its
undemocratic character flowed, however, from the constitutional authority of the Communist Party 
to monopolize elections and to abrogate or interpret that constitution as it saw fit, thereby maximizing 
"flexibility."4 And what rendered that "constitution" not a constitution at all was the fact that, given
this flexibility at the hands of the Party, it was irrelevant as a coordination mechanism. The true 
source of coordination in Soviet society was the Party, which adhered to nothing but the most abstract 
and meaningless definition of citizen sovereignty.5
Insofar as a constitution's stability is concerned, it is evident that if it is an effective constitution 
- - if it coordinates action - - then the constitution itself must be an equilibrium in the sense that no 
individual within the society has an incentive and the ability to defect to some other strategy. In fact, 
since we cannot preclude the possibility that subsets of citizens can coordinate their actions so as to 
act in accordance with some new agreement precluded by the constitution, a stable constitution must 
be a strong equilibrium. 6 
3 Indeed, by implementing a "popularly elected" Peoples' Congress that elected a Supreme Soviet
that elected, in turn, a chief executive or executive council, the several editions of the USSR's 
constitution bore a remarkable resemblance to the original Virginia Plan. 
4 By democratic we mean that there exists some identifiable link between policy outcomes and
the preferences of the entire citizenry. Of course we must be careful here since we can say that even 
a dictator exists at the forbearance of a citizenry that refuses to risk life and limb to rise up in arms 
against him. Thus, this minimal condition of democracy requires that the link not be "too lengthy" 
or forged by "improper" coercion. We forego forging a strict definition for obvious reasons. 
5 We see here, of course, why constitutions, unlike statutory laws, are best kept simple and
difficult to change. Rendering a constitution difficult to change becomes itself part of its 
coordinating character - - if everyone believes that everyone else will act so that the constitution is 
difficult to change, then this degree of difficulty will in fact characterize the established political 
order. 
6 A strong equilibrium (c.f., Aumann 1959) is a set of strategies such that no subset of individuals 
can coordinate their actions in such a way that they all share an incentive to defect simultaneously 
to some other set of strategies. So restated in game-theoretic terms, a constitution is stable if, given 
all other constitutions that might be devised -- democratic or otherwise -- the constitution in question 
is a core. 
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This definition does not specify the requirements for a strong constitutional equilibrium, but the 
preceding discussion reveals three general requirements. First, a stable constitution must produce 
social outcomes that are generally regarded as efficient, otherwise all or nearly all of society will 
prefer a different arrangement. We appreciate, of course, the fact that any constitutional change 
entails uncertainty and that societies prefer "revolution" under only unusual and adverse circumstance. 
Thus, any notion of efficiency must take account of the costs of transforming the status quo. Second, 
the rules and procedures a stable constitution establishes must be sufficiently clear to allow for 
subsidiary planning and strategic maneuver. The failure to satisfy this requirement, as illustrated by 
the various Soviet constitutions, denies the possibility of stable expectations and the effective 
coordination of political activity. Third, because evaluations of nearly all actions are contingent on 
the outcomes produced by the political process, those outcomes must exhibit some minimal degree of 
predictability. A constitutional order must allow for stable expectations about the consequences of 
non-governmental as well as governmental actions. 
4 .  Social Choice Theory 
To have any practical value, these abstract requirements must be translated into specific 
mechanisms for social coordination, which takes us to the issue of constitutional design. However, 
one additional matter must be attended to. Because Riker's argument for constitutions of a particular 
type depends on social choice theory's implications and because the pluralist view depends heavily 
of the nature of those instabilities that pervade society, it is important to specify the precise nature 
of those implications. We begin, then, with Arrow's (1963) General Possibility Theorem which, 
without resorting to yet another summary of his analysis, tells us that7 
Result 1: for virtually any non-dictatorial social choice rule, procedure, institution or the like, 
there will exist individual preferences such that the social preference as revealed by that rule 
is intransitive. 
7 Another result, Gibbard ( 1 973) and Satterthwaite's ( 1 975) Manipulability Result, is closely 
related to Arrow's and tells us that for virtually any non-dictatorial social choice rule, procedure. 
institution or the like, there will exist individual preferences such that one or more persons will have 
an incentive to alter the preferences they report in order to bring about a more favored outcome. Thus, 
there is no guarantee that any democratic institution or procedure will induce a truthful revelation 
of preferences. Thus result, though, is not central to our argument. 
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This theorem tells us, then, that there is no guarantee that individual preferences can be used to 
define or to identify outcomes that society ought to prefer -- indeed, there is no guarantee that a 
"best" social policy can be said to exist. 
Arrow's Theorem is general and does not apply only to varieties of majority rule. But because 
majority rule plays such an important role in constitutional theory, the next result on which we must 
rely and which we can attribute to Plott (1967) and Davis and Hinich (1966), focuses on those 
circumstances in which outcomes and preferences are of the type that arise when government 
decisions concern the allocation of public funds over public goods (Ordeshook 1986). 
Result 2: if social decisions are made by majority rule and if preferences are multidimensional 
and spatial, then the set of preference configurations that occasion an undominated outcome -
- an outcome that cannot be defeated by some other in a majority vote -- is generically empty. 
More specifically, if we require two or more issue dimensions to characterize all relevant individual 
preferences and feasible policies, then, in general, every feasible outcome can be defeated by some 
other feasible policy. 
A third result established by McKelvey (1976) and Schofield (1978) shows the full consequences 
of Result 2:8 
Result 3: if social decisions are made by majority rule, if preferences are multidimensional 
and spatial, then if there is no undominated outcome, the social preference order is wholly 
intransitive over the entire set of possible policy outcomes. 
Thus, if x and y are any two feasible policies, then there exists some sequence of feasible policies 
(z1,z2, .. .,zk) such that x defeats z1 in a majority vote, z1 defeats z2, . ... , and zk defeats y.
Results 2 and 3 have occasioned considerable research into elections, committees, legislatures, 
voting procedures, and so on. We cannot review that literature here, but one result -- Black's (1958) 
Median Voter Theorem -- warrants special attention: 
8 There are some technical conditions that must be imposed on outcomes and preferences for 
this result to apply; however, we prefer to avoid such matters since they detract from the main thrust 
of the argument. 
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Result 4: if preferences can be characterized by a single issue (equivalently, if all preferences 
are single-peaked), the median ideal preference is a Condorcet winner and the social 
preference order under majority rule is wholly transitive. 
Thus, if two candidates compete under the circumstances described by this result, if all citizens vote 
for their most preferred candidate, and if each candidate seeks to win the election, both candidates 
should identify with the median ideal preference. 
Three additional results elaborate on the properties of majority rule when preferences are not 
single-peaked -- when policies alternatives are multidimensional and the theorems of Plott, Davis and 
Hinich, McKelvey, and Schofield apply. First, for two-candidate elections (McKelvey and 
Ordeshook 1976, McKelvey 1 986): 
Result 5: if preferences are spatial and multi-dimensional, then, in general, there is no 
equilibrium in two-candidate election contests -- there is no policy towards which the 
candidates must eventually converge -- but if the distribution of preferences is "sufficiently 
tight," the candidates will not choose policies far from the electorate's median preference on 
each salient election issue. 
The part of this result that warrants emphasis is that although any incumbent can be defeated by a 
sufficiently astute challenger, policies themselves -- the candidates' campaign platforms -- need not 
be subject to any great change. That is, although the Median Voter Theorem does not apply in multi­
issue contests, the centralizing tendency it uncovers is a general property of two-candidate majority 
rule elections.9
Turning from two-candidate elections to committees (legislatures) that use some variant of 
majority rule, we know that (Miller 1980, Shepsle and Weingast 1 9 8 1 ,  Ordeshook and Schwartz 1987), 
Result 6: if a majority-rule committee uses a "typical" agenda to order the outcomes that it 
must consider, then in general, the final outcome will depend on the specific form of that 
agenda and the outcomes that are considered. Also, if there are no restrictions on agendas, then 
9 We emphasize that this result employs a variety of assumptions that may not be satisfied in
reality. Candidates can diverge on the issues, then, if citizens who are dissatisfied with both 
candidates fail to vote and if preferences are distributed bimodally on the issues or if the candidates 
are not able to adjust their positions freely on the issues. Moreover, the variability in policy will 
increase as the size of the electorate decreases and as the variability in the electorates' preferences 
increases. 
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a greater variety of outcomes can prevail that would prevail under a 2-candidate election 
format. 
A considerable body of research is directed at learning the impact of institutional structures such 
as bicameralism and parliamentary procedures, and this research tells us that not only can those 
institutions have a profound effect on final outcomes, but also that the extent to which a particular 
institution or procedural detail can mitigate against disequilibrium depends not only on the character 
of those institutions and procedures. but also on the character of individual preferences (c.f., Shepsle 
and Weingast 1981 ,  Denzau and Mackay 198 1 ,  Hammond and Miller 1987). Specifically, although 
a procedure such as issue-by-issue voting can induce a stable outcome when preferences are separable 
-- when a person's most preferred policy on each issue is independent of whatever prevails on the 
remaining issues -- such a procedure need not induce stability when preferences are not separable. 
There is one result, though, that, as we see later, is important for constitutional design: Briefly, 
Result 7: if preferences are spatial and multi-dimensional and if the preference distribution 
is "sufficiently tight," then the status quo is stable if a majority vote quote greater than 64% is 
employed (Caplan and Nalebuff 1988). 
A final important result reveals the change that occurs in the nature of these equilibrium results 
when government policy concerns redistributive issues. 
Result 8: If the allocation of some fixed resource (e.g., money) is to be determined by majority 
rule, then even if citizens give weight to the welfare of others, there is no stable policy proposal. 
Moreover, short of unanimity, the size of the majority that defines winning merely effects the 
number of people from whom resources can be expropriated, but not the nonexistence of a 
stable policy. 
Although all Results but 1 pertain to majority rule institutions, we can assume on the basis of an 
extensive body of subsidiary research, that their general form extends to all institutions and 
procedures we might deem "democratic." Results 2-8 in conjunction with this subsidiary research 
allow us to utter some general propositions about democratic processes, however enriched those 
processes might be by complexity and institutional detail. 
14 
I. Barring unusual configurations of individual preferences, a cyclic social preference is 
virtually inescapable. 
2. Although in accordance with implication I, there cannot be any permanent winners and losers
in any democratic system, institutions can mitigate against wide swings in public policy, at
least insofar as those institutions do not address distributive matters.
3. Although final policy outcomes depend on procedural details and the ways in which those
details are manipulated, the ability to manipulate outcomes is not unconstrained. Moreover,
those limits become more severe as the preferences over which the institutions operate become
more homogeneous and concentrated about some "middle" position.
5. Although the instabilities associated with majority rule can imply considerable variability in
the identities of winning and losing candidates and parties, that variability does not extend
necessarily to policy outcomes.
5. Designing Stable and Effective Constitutions 
Earlier we argue that an effective constitution is a set of rules that facilitates the coordination of 
political action in such a way as to induce equilibrium actions and stable expectations about political 
process and policy and where the constitution itself is a strong equilibrium. This statement can be 
reformulated to require that an effective constitution must do two things: (I) coordinate social action 
to an equilibrium and (2) ensure that out of the universe of possibilities, the equilibrium that is in fact 
achieved is deemed "reasonable" by a sufficiently large portion of society -- large enough, at least, 
to render the constitution a strong equilibrium. In the lexicon of principle-agent theory, the first 
difficulty is to ensure that the agent (the state) coordinates the principle's actions (the governed) to 
achieve an equilibrium - - coordination that, from time to time, may require coercion - - whereas the 
second difficulty is to ensure that the equilibrium is "appropriate" in the sense that the agent does not 
tyrannize on behalf of itself or any other faction. 
The mechanism whereby a democratic state accomplishes these objectives is outlined in The 
Federalist, but there are gaps in the argument. To see them and to see how social choice theory helps 
fill them in, let us consider an especially simple possibility, a society that confronts, on an annual 
basis, only one issue that divides its members into disparate positions. Suppose this issue is of the 
usual sort that arises when people choose how to divide the government's budget between two 
alternative services -- how much to spend, for instance, on national defense versus social welfare 
services. Different voters will prefer different patterns of spending, but to make a final decision 
suppose society, informed of the virtues of majority rule, operates without any formal constitution 
but meets once a year so that members can submit alternative proposals (policies). Suppose two of 
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these alternatives are chosen at random and that the final policy is selected using a majority vote. 
Although this procedure is simple, direct, and democratic, everyone's optimal strategy is to submit 
their ideal preference so that if preferences are dispersed, there is little predictability to social policy 
no reasonably stable expectation about outcomes. 
To secure stable expectations, suppose instead that society chooses a person at random to "run" 
against an incumbent, lets both persons compete by proposing alternative policies, uses a majority 
vote to determine a new incumbent, implements the policy advocated by that new incumbent, and 
compensates the winner sufficiently so that winners gain more by implementing their promises than 
by implementing their ideal policy -- that is, suppose the society conforms to Dahl's ( 1 956) ideal of 
a polyarchy. At this point we can appeal to the Median Voter Theorem (Result 4), which tells us that 
a stable outcome prevails and that that outcome corresponds to society's median preference. 
Of course, our society could just as easily poll its members and implement the median directly. 
Indeed, there are many procedures that produce identical final outcomes. For example, voters could 
nominate alternative policies, and subsequently vote over all nominated alternatives using some 
agenda. Or voters could nominate persons to nominate alternatives, and so on. Each of these 
procedures, though, yields the identical outcome - - the median preference (Ordeshook 1986) -­
which means that there should be little disagreement over the way majority rule is implemented. 
Having unanimously agreed to some variant of majority rule, there is no apparent need for a 
formal written constitution that proscribes the use of any particular rule. Indeed, as long as there is 
some agreement that no one ought to be permanently disenfranchised, this society's political stability 
originates as much from its internal cohesion as it does from any explicit constitutional provision. 
Now let matters become more complicated and suppose society confronts an additional issue each 
year that requires resolution -- for example, the severity of public standards to place on air quality. 
Once again, people could be polled on each issue and the two medians implemented as policy. But 
now social choice theory alerts us to two new dilemmas. First, what a person prefers on one issue may 
depend on what prevails on the other, in which case a simple poll of society will not suffice and the 
outcome of any poll will depend on the way questions are posed. Second, even if the issues are wholly 
disjoint, it may soon become evident that, in accordance with Results 2 and 3, other policies are 
preferred by a majority to the one that corresponds to the median preference on each issue. 
A third fact complicates matters further. Even though society may adhere to majoritarian 
principles, the way in which those principles are implemented influence outcomes. If people 
nominate alternatives to be placed on some agenda, the final outcome depends, among other things, 
on the location of the nominated alternatives in the agenda. And people are no longer indifferent 
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between using an agenda and using the two-candidate election format, because the outcome that an 
agenda yields can differ from the one that a two-candidate election produces (Result 6).10
This last fact leads to yet another problem for society -- procedures inherit the instability of final 
outcomes, procedures for choosing procedures inherit this instability, and so on (Coleman and 
Ferejohn 1986). When society confronts a single issue so that one outcome dominates the rest, people 
are indifferent as to how majority rule is implemented. But if every outcome can be upset by some 
other outcome and if procedures can be designed to lead to any outcome, then people will hold 
different preferences over procedures and any social in transitivity over outcomes will transfer to these 
procedures. So, just as preferences over procedures will in general be intransitive (Result I), 
preferences over procedures for choosing procedures will also be intransitive, and so on ad infinitum. 
Clearly, this infinite regress must be terminated by some convention or rule, for otherwise society 
is incapable of making any decision that establishes stable expectations about process or outcome. 
Fortunately, it is at this point that we can use the fact that although people may have preferences over 
which procedure to use in resolving contemporaneous issues, they are less likely to hold such 
preferences for decisions made in the future, especially if a Rawlsian ( 1 971)  veil of ignorance 
characterizes the situation. "Agreement on rules is much more likely to emerge than agreement on 
policy alternatives within rules, because of the difficulties in identifying precisely the individual's 
economic interests in the first setting . . .  [especially if] the rule to be chosen is expected to remain in 
existence over a whole sequence of time periods . . .  " (Buchanan 1 987: 3 10). If I cannot know which 
procedure will most benefit me in the future and if I value the time that can be saved by avoiding 
incessant debate over process as each opportunity to decide something arises, then I will prefer 
committing to the same "fair" procedure in every circumstance. Even if issues arise in which I see 
temporary advantage in some alternative procedure, then just as cooperation is sustained in the 
repeated prisoners' dilemma despite the myopic incentive to defect to non-cooperation, I should 
10 The strategic complexity of procedures also introduces the problem that unless all members of
society devote the same effort at "playing the game of politics," those with greater resources will come 
to dominate final outcomes because they are better able to deduce the consequences of alternative 
actions. That is, strategic complexity places a premium on the ability to discern the strategies of 
others and appropriate strategic responses. Madison clearly foresees this possibility: Another effect 
of public instability is .the unreasonable advantage it gives to the sagacious, the enterprising, and the 
moneyed few over the industrious and uninformed mass of the people. Every new regulation concerning 
commerce or revenue, or in any manner affecting the value of the different species of property, presents 
a new harvest to those who watch the change, and can trace its consequences; a harvest reared not by 
themselves but by the toils and cares of the great body of their fellow-citizens. This is a state of things 
in which it may be said with some truth that the laws are made for the few, not for the many (ibid, #62: 
3 1 7). Complexity alone, then, as opposed to the content of issues establishes a new, strategic, elite. 
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choose to abide by the status quo procedure if deviations unlock the door to future chaos and to the 
regress from which society had earlier escaped.11
Now consider whether society can ensure policy stability. If society implements a two-candidate 
election format, it will observe two things. First, a challenger can find another policy that is 
preferred by a majority regardless of the incumbent's strategy (Result 5). Thus, no candidate remains 
in office long and policies change from election to election. However, policies will not change greatly 
unless preferences over policy are widely dispersed -- indeed, they may not change in a way that is 
deemed significant by most members of society (McKelvey and Ordeshook 1976, McKelvey 1986). 
We may observe instability in the identities of winning and losing candidates, but this instability need 
not translate into any great instability in policy. 
6. Redistributive Politics
Thus far we have assumed that the government is concerned only with regulating the supply of
public goods. There is, though, no circumstance in which the state is restricted to only this role. 
Providing for national defense, highways, or education, for example, necessarily confers differential 
private benefits and costs, because goods that are public in consumption have private consequences 
in production. In addition to those distributive costs associated with taxation, there is the fact that 
someone must secure the contract to build a weapons system, to lay concrete, and to print textbooks. 
In short, it is impossible for the state to avoid the issue of the redistribution of wealth. 
Redistribution, moreover, need not take a purely economic form. States with ethnic, linguistic, or 
religious conflicts are, in effect, constantly threatened with the salience of redistributive issues to the 
extent that the government's policies are perceived as necessarily conferring recognition or power to 
one group at the expense of another. 
Adjusting our analysis of the previous section, then, suppose that society shifts its focus to the 
methods of generating revenues to pay for public services. Social choice theory now tells us that this 
change yields a radically different situation. Specifically, if redistribution becomes salient, then not 
only does instability traverse the entire domain of feasible policies, but even with a two-candidate 
election format, final outcomes can include those that reduce some maximal minority to poverty 
(Result 8) . Thus, if public preferences concern issues of the form "the government ought to spend 
... on education, national defense, urban renewal, and so on" and if the methods whereby governments 
raise the revenues for providing these services is somehow not salient, then a winner-take-all election 
11 Perhaps a classic constitutional example of this argument is the electoral college feature of the 
US Constitution. Although the electoral college allows for the possibility that a candidate can win 
the presidency without a positive vote plurality, there is no reason to suppose that this possibility 
favors a Republican or a Democratic candidate, so this electoral arrangement causes no great concern. 
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format produces outcomes about the center of gravity of preferences. But if preferences concern 
"who pays" for these services or if these services confer differential benefits across society, then the 
system changes in a fundamental way. Indeed, even if people divide into a few "classes" or categories 
-- rich, poor, black, white, labor, capital, farm, non-farm, urban, rural, etc. -- not only is there no 
stable outcome, but candidates can jockey for electoral advantage by advocating extreme policies that 
pit these categories against each other and thereby threaten the rights and even the existence of 
minorities. 
There are, then, two types of instabilities. One type, derived from different tastes over public 
goods, can be regulated with simple constitutional forms such as winner-take-all election procedures 
that yield two party systems, where by "regulated" we mean the establishment of stable expectations 
about policy outcomes. The second type, which arises if wealth or political power is redistributed, 
cannot be regulated effectively in the same way. Something other than simple populist procedures 
are required to dampen the extent of inherent instabilities or to keep such issues from becoming 
salient in the first place. Society might try to avoid political instability and extreme violation of rights 
by relying on norms of fairness and the like, but, quoting Madison out of context, "history has taught 
us that other precautions are necessary." The question, then, is: what precautions, if any, can keep 
such issues from threatening the fabric of the state. 
Since an interest or coalition of interests that proposes to redistribute away from others in a 
significant way seems the very essence of a Madisonian faction -- "a number of citizens .. .  who are 
united and actuated by some common impulse or passion, or of interest, adverse to the rights of other 
citizens, or to the permanent and aggregate interests of the community" (ibid, #10: 43) - - it seems 
only reasonable to begin with Madison's solution to the problem. That solution, of course, is the 
expansive republic that accommodates such an extensive array of divergent interests that it becomes 
impossible or at least impractical for majority factions to form. For Madison, then, the solution is, 
like the one offered by pluralists, to be found in society's extra-constitutional construction. 
It is at this point, though, that Madison's theory is weakest. For example, because of the dilution 
in the value of any individual vote that it implies, Madison's prescription, without countervailing 
institutional devices, necessarily increases the problems associated with rational ignorance and the 
transfer of power to an informed elite (Aranson 1990). Thus, as Calhoun argues, 
The right of suffrage, of itself, can do no more than give complete control to those who elect 
over the conduct of those they have elected. In doing this, it accomplishes all that it can 
accomplish .. .  The more perfectly is does this, the more perfectly it accomplishes its ends; but 
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in doing so, it only changes the seat of authority without counteracting, in the least, the tendency 
of the government to oppression and abuse of its powers. (ibid, pp. 12-13)12
Aside from an ad hoc appeal to transaction costs, there is a second potential justification for 
Madison's argument, as is summarized by the following reasoning: "If I know that any proposed 
redistributive coalition is unstable and likely to be replaced in short order with another coalition, and 
if I am as likely to be included in a losing coalition as a winning one at any point in time, then if I 
am risk averse, I should prefer that redistributive issues never arise or that some equitable resolution 
be imposed for all time. And if everyone else feels the same as I, then surely we can coordinate to 
such an outcome with or without a written constitution." 
This argument encapsulates pluralist political theory, and indeed, it may be correct if society is 
divided into innumerable crosscutting cleavages and if there is nothing that can be used as the basis 
for forming a permanent winning faction. The pluralist argument is incorrect and dangerous, then, 
if there are "natural" ways for winning factions to coordinate. A society divided into two racial, 
ethnic, or language groups will, in all likelihood, find it easier to coordinate so that one group 
expropriates from the other. Russians in the USSR, Serbs in Yugoslavia, English speakers in Canada, 
and whites nearly everywhere outside of Asia can discriminate knowing that only some minimal 
socialization will allow ethnicity, language, or race to be a permanent mechanism of coordination. 
For example, even if a pluralistic nexus of economic interdependencies and interests were to evolve, 
proclaiming the USSR democratic by imposing a populist constitution is unlikely to result in much 
political stability (and certainly we have here an opportunity for establishing a world record extended 
"republic"). Moreover, even if redistributive politics is ultimately unstable despite such factors, 
neither social choice theory nor any other theory for that matter, can preclude such coordination or 
tell us about the durability of such redistributive arrangements - - indeed, their durability may be just 
great enough. 
With this concern in mind, let us consider the solution of concurrent majorities - - the rule of 
unanimity -- offered by Calhoun: 
12 Indeed, we might even conjecture that Madison concurred with this argument: I go on this
great republican principle that the people will have virtue and intelligence to select men of virtue and 
wisdom. Is there no virtue among us? If they be none, we are in a wretched situation. No theoretical 
checks, no form of government can render us secure. To suppose that any form of government will 
secure liberty or happiness without any virtue in the people is a chimmeral idea. (Madison: Virginia 
ratifying convention, as quoted by Wills, ibid, p. xxi.) 
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There is but one certain mode in which this result can be secured, and that is by the adoption 
of some restriction or limitation which shall so effectively prevent any one interest or 
combination of interests from obtaining excessive control of the government ,,, [and this] can 
be accomplished only in one way, and that is by such an organism of government -- and, if 
necessary for the purpose, of the community also -- as will, by dividing and distributing the 
powers of government, give to each division or interest, through its appropriate organ, either a 
concurrent voice in making and executing the laws or a veto on their execution (ibid, p. 20). 
There is, of course, at least one objection to Calhoun's prescription (aside from the observation 
that its moral legitimacy can be defended only if the status quo is one in which all members of society 
currently enjoy their civil liberties - - a condition that can hardly be said to have been satisfied in 
Calhoun's day). Specifically, if every potential interest, however small, has a veto, then the danger 
is that the state will be rendered immobile. 13 Calhoun, though, does not argue for a wholly catholic 
use of unanimity rule. It is of course true that moving from simple (50%) majority rule to, say, %­
majority rule where 50% < X < 100%, does not necessarily eliminate the cyclic character of 
redistributive matters (such a move merely shrinks the size of the subpopulation from which the 
majority can expropriate) and that only 100%-majority rule is guaranteed to ensure against 
expropriation (Result 8). But Calhoun offers this essentially mathematical counter-argument: 
yet even when, instead of the sense of each and of all, it takes that of a few great and 
prominent interests only, it would still, in a great measure, if not a/together, fulfill the end 
intended by a constitution. For in such case it would require so large a portion of the 
community, compared with the whole, to concur or acquiesce in the action of the government that 
the number to be plundered would be too few and the number to be aggrandized too many to 
afford adequate motives to oppression and the abuse of its powers. (ibid pp. 2 1 -22) 
7. Separation of Powers 
Calhoun's argument is nearly persuasive and appears to match Riker's argument. Rather than rely
on the inherent difficulty of assembling a winning coalition in the face of a complex nexus of 
interests, the separation of powers and the associated devices of a two-chamber legislature in which 
13 We suspect that it is possible to design a repeated play veto game involving redistribution in
which players rarely if ever use the veto for "ephemeral" reasons owing to the threat that they will 
be punished subsequently for doing so by counter-vetoes (c.f., Lijphart 1 977: 36-8). However, owing 
to the Folk Theorems of game theory that tell us about the multiplicity of equilibria in a game, it 
should also be possible to establish the existence of different equilibrium patterns of action. 
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each chamber is elected independently of the other, a popularly elected chief executive with a veto, 
and an independent judiciary all raise the vote quota necessary to pass any measure and increase the 
likelihood that there are outcomes that cannot be upset if they become the status quo (Buchanan and 
Tullock 1962, Hammond and Miller 1987, Miller and Hammond 1989). Notice, however, that 
there are simpler devices that serve the same end, including requiring that an incumbent who directs 
a unitary state be defeated only with an extraordinary majority, and it is important to see why such 
"resolutions" are unsatisfactory. First, as Hamilton and Madison express the matter 
Has it not . . .  invariably been found that momentary passions. and immediate interests, have a 
more active and imperious control over human conduct than general or remote considerations 
of policy, utility, or justice? (ibid: xxx) 
A dependence on the people is no doubt the primary control on the government, but experience 
has taught mankind the necessity of auxiliary precautions (ibid, 
#51:  262), 
Merely raising a vote quota may make it difficult for people to tyrannize, but it does not make it 
impossible for them to do so. 
There is a second and more compelling argument against such a solution, namely that it opens the 
door to the tyranny of the state. Recall that society is likely to care more about policy than about the 
fates of unsuccessful candidates or defeated incumbents, and that policy stability can coexist with 
candidate instability. The problem, though, is "whether rulers in a populist system can be expected 
to maintain the electoral arrangements for liberal democracy" (Riker 1982: 248). Although voters are 
not likely to care much about the fates of politicians who successively leave office, politicians are 
unlikely to be fond of such a system. If a person's goal is to win election, we should not be surprised 
to see that person exercising every effort to do precisely that, and helping them by raising the vote 
quota is poor insurance against those who would retain office to corrupt the system. Put differently, 
"when supreme anthority is vested in a single center of authority, distinctions between constitutional 
decision making and governmental decision making can no longer be made" (Ostrom 1 987: 141) ,  and 
as Riker ( 1 982: 249) elaborates, 
in populist systems both the temptation and the ability to weaken the electoral sanction are 
especially strong ,,, with a populist interpretation of voting it is easy for rulers to believe their 
programs are the "true" will of the people and hence more precious that the constitution and 
22 
free elections. Populism reinforces the normal arrogance of rulers with a built-in justification 
for tyranny, the contemporary version of the divine right of rulers. 
Fortunately, a separation of powers does more than merely raise vote quotas. As Madison states 
The great security against a gradual concentration of the several powers in the same department 
consists of giving to those who administer each department the necessary constitutional means 
and personal motives to resist the encroachments of others .. .  ambition must be made to counter 
act ambition (ibid, #51:  262). 
A separation of powers, then, seeks to initiate a natural competition among the state's branches 
so that only a balance of power that protects liberty prevails in equilibrium. Establishing such a 
balance requires two things: at least three decision makers with contradictory goals and rules that 
define how one subset of decision makers can thwart the goal of another subset. Jn international 
affairs, the decision makers are nation states, the goal is the maximization of wealth that manifests 
itself as the pursuit of power, and the rules are a majoritarian-like system in which coalitions with 
more power can block the ambitions of coalitions with less. 
The components of this balance in international affairs arise "naturally" out of the anarchy of the 
competition for scarce resources (Niou and Ordeshook 1990, 1991 ), whereas the components of intra­
state balances, including even the identities of the relevant decision makers, are the consequence of 
constitutional structures. In fact, in its specification of jurisdictions, the United States Constitution 
defines three separate balances of power. First, there is a balance among three branches that regulates 
the interpretation of the constitution itself - - although the Supreme Court oversees this process, the 
Senate and the president regulate the Court's membership. Second, there is the balance among the 
executive and the two houses of the legislature that regulates statutory measures. Finally, there is the 
balance among the two houses of the legislature and the states that regulates changes in the 
constitution itself.14
The specification of jurisdictions, though, merely defines the relevant decision makers - - it is one 
thing to say that "ambition must be made to counter act ambition," it is another thing to design a 
system in which this is so. Hence, the next step in constructing a balance consists of ensuring that 
these decision makers do not have identical goals, which is accomplished by assuring that each 
14 Notice that this construction cannot be implemented with a unicameral legislature, and thus
a bicameral structure allows for greater flexibility in the separation and design of these balances. 
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decision entity has a different relation to the ultimate sovereign, the people.15 To see how this is
accomplished in a presidential system and to see also the problems associated with parliamentary ones, 
notice that legislative or parliamentary election districts can easily become captive of an extended 
form of the prisoners' dilemma in which representatives from each district provide, at national public 
expense, particularized benefits for their constituencies that are generally economically ill-advised 
(Aranson and Ordeshook 1985). What keeps legislatures from resolving this social inefficiency, 
however, is the fact that constituents, acting in a decentralized way owing to the federal structure of 
representation, elect legislators who are best suited to providing those benefits -- voters are 
themselves trapped in a dilemma in which no constituency elects unilaterally a representative who 
would oppose such legislation (Fiorina and Noll 1978, Niou and Ordeshook 1 985). The force working 
to resolve this dilemma in presidential systems is that, when voting for president, citizens can register 
their dissatisfaction with governmental inefficiency. This is uot to say that the ensuing policy conflict 
between president and legislature will be resolved in favor of greater efficiency. This argument, 
though, illustrates how electoral imperatives can create different preferences between two branches 
of government, differences that do not exist necessarily in parliamentary systems. 
The final step in the construction of a balance of power is to specify the rules whereby one set 
of decision makers can counter the actions of another. The difficulty here, of course, is that the 
measure of "power" must be invented and defined constitutionally, which is a task that the United 
States Constitution accomplishes by giving each decision maker a veto within its jurisdiction. 
This American arrangement is one possibility, but recall that if a constitution is an effective 
coordinating device, it must provide for stable expectations with respect to each jurisdiction. 
Awarding a jurisdiction to a single branch of government threatens tyranny and instability, which 
occurs whenever a chief executive is given the power to suspend a constitution (as in many newly­
formed "democracies") or to issue dictatorial decrees (as in the former Soviet Union), or when a 
legislature can rewrite the constitution at its own discretion (as in the Republic of China's National 
Assembly). On the other hand, awarding multiple jurisdictions without a veto (for example, allowing 
both branches of Congress, or any branch plus the president to pass and implement legislation as is 
the case in parliamentary systems) merely creates the potential for instability and incoherence of the 
type that social choice theory ascribes to majority rule. The veto, of course, is inherently 
conservative, but it maximizes the likelihood that a constitution can generate stable expectations. 
15 With the popular election of United States Senators allowed by the Seventeenth Amendment,
it is possible to argue that the incentives of Senators and members of the House of Representatives 
do not differ sufficiently, which in turn provides one of the pieces of the explanation for 
governmental growth and inefficiency that some scholars decry (Tullock 1987). 
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8. Federalism
Because the separation of powers impedes the state's ability to upset the status quo precipitously, 
this device accomplishes another end -- it slows the governmental process so as to move us closer to 
the pluralist's objective of a system "in which there is a high probability that an active and legitimate 
group in the population can make itself heard effectively at some crucial stage in the process of 
decision" (Dahl 1956, p. 145). However, we must now consider whether constitutional balances of 
power sap the state's vitality. Indeed, as Madison observed, 
Energy in government is essential ... Stability in government is essential . . .  On comparing. 
however, these valuable ingredients with the vital principles of liberty, we must perceive at once 
the difficulty of mingling them together in their due proportions. (ibid., #37:1 77-8)  
Hamilton concurs but adds, 
the power of preventing bad laws includes that of preventing good ones . . .  [but] the injury 
which may possibly be done by defeating a few good laws will be amply compensated by the 
advantage of preventing a number of bad ones (ibid: 373-4) 
The difficulty is that each goal -- energy and stability -- complements the other and simple 
tradeoffs are not apparent. There is, though, an additional institution that warrants examination in 
this context - - federalism -- because it is frequently an important part of the separation of powers 
framework and because its design bears directly on both stability and energy. 
At the outset, we should differentiate between the two forms of federalism that Aranson ( 1990) 
calls constitutional versus contingent decentralization. Contingent decentralization "locates all 
sovereignty in the central government. That government then decides ... how much authority to 
devolve to the constituent units," whereas in constitutional decentralization "the authority of the states 
. . .  is guaranteed as a matter of organic, constitutional law" (p. 20). 
In choosing between these two forms it is useful to keep in mind the three common justifications 
for federalism. The first justification is that it acts as an agent of efficiency by providing for 
competition between political units in the supply of public services (Wildavsky 1990, Dye 1990a). 
Federalism does this by allowing people and investment to "vote with their feet" (Tiebout 1956), 
thereby generating a market for public goods, and by allowing for experimentation in public goods 
provision (Dye 1990b). The second justification also pertains to efficiency. Since people's 
preferences for public goods and services differ, if externality effects can be isolated geographically, 
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allowing for geographic decentralization in supply is efficient. The final justification is related to 
the second. Federalism allows states that are otherwise satisfied with local control of public services 
to join in order to realize various economies of scale in public goods provision. The most evident 
historical example of such scale economies arise in the provision of national defense, and thus Riker 
( 1964) concludes that the existence of an external threat is a necessary condition for the formation 
of a federal state. It remains to be seen, however, whether increased economic competition in a world 
market economy will serve the same purpose when some states, most notably Japan, act as predators 
intent on maximizing market share. 
The argument now for contingent decentralization is that it provides a fully flexible state form. 
However, the problem is that we do not know how to construct a constitution that guarantees anything 
approximating the optimal allocation of governmental responsibility -- indeed, we do not even know 
how to identify that optimum since presuming that we can do so is to assume that we can direct the 
centrally planned state.16 Moreover, since contingent federalism precludes constitutionally defined 
barriers between levels of government, we should suppose that the most naturally powerful level -­
the national -- will soon aggrandize all authority (which, of course, is not an historical process 
unfamiliar to most of us). Thus, the only viable federalism, if we are to have a federal structure at 
all, is a constitutional one (Aranson 1990, Wildavsky 1 990). 
Of course, constitutional decentralization is essential if a society consists of hostile ethnic or 
religious groups that live in distinct, geographically defined regions such as the USSR or Yugoslavia. 
In this instance, though, constitutional coordination may be impossible and federalism becomes little 
more that a treaty in which these groups agree to cooperate only on issues in which there are 
significant economies of scale, such as defense. What we want to consider, though, are the 
justifications for this form of federalism in states such as the United States and Taiwan, which do not 
have geographically defined ethnic, religious, or racial cleavages. 
We can begin with Ostrom ( 1987), who rejects the idea that a simple separation of powers is 
sufficient to secure majority and minority rights and who accepts the view that a state designed 
simply to thwart ambition with ambition creates stalemate: 
16 It may be true that the allocation of authority will be determined ultimately by voter 
preferences, but this implies that there are no constitutional guarantees against aggrandizement and 
thus, .contingent federalism serves no purpose in terms of facilitating stability. Because contingent 
federalism's properties are derivative, whether it facilitates stability, efficiency or any other goal is 
a function of other constitutional provisions. Also, to the extent that federalisms are contingent, it 
will appear to play no role in determining the allocation of responsibilities since that allocation is 
determined by other factors. Most theoretical models of federalism assume constitutional 
decentralization whereas most federalisms are contingent, and this fact explains Riker's (1969) 
conclusion that theoretical predictions about federalism's influence fail to be borne out empirically. 
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Drawing upon the principle of opposite and rival interests . . .  creates a potentiality for stalemate 
and immobility on the part of governments rather than due deliberation and a reduction of 
propensities to err . . .  Madison's conception .. .  will not suffice to prevent people from warring 
upon one another where the other is viewed as the enemy with whom one shares no potential 
community of interest. (pp. 1 62-3) 
Instead, Ostrom argues, federalism provides the final guarantee of stability by facilitating deliberation 
in government processes, 
Instead of relying upon a unitary arrangement inherent in the constitution of a single republic, 
the major remedy of The Federalist lay in compounding a republic so that self-government can 
operate concurrently in the government of different communities of interest (p. !04). 
That Madison saw federalism as a piece of the solution to national stability is clear: 
The influence of factious leaders may kindle a flame within their particular States, but will 
be unable to spread a general conflagration through the other States; a religious sect, may 
degenerate into a political faction in a part of the Confederacy, but the variety of sects 
dispersed over the entire face of it, must secure the national Councils against any danger from 
that source; a rage for paper money, for an abolition of debts. for an equal division of 
property, or for any other wicked or improper project, will be less apt to pervade the whole 
body of the Union, than a particular member of it . . .  (ibid: # IO: 48-9) . 
It is clear from this passage that Madison assumed that it is not the pluralist nexus of interests that 
holds society in check, but rather the constitution boundaries that define a federal system. To see 
how this is done - - to see how federalism can induce stability of the sort sought by social choice 
theorists -- imagine that each regional issue is an issue dimension in some n-dimensional issue space. 
Most persons will greatly about only those dimensions that pertain to their region, although they may 
have preferences over the remaining issues if they believe that choices there will eventually influence 
choices on the issues they deem salient. This n-dimensional arrangement, of course, is fertile ground 
for instability (Results 2 and 3), but federalism can assign different issues to different political 
jurisdictions in much the same way as Shepsle and Weingast ( !981 )  argue that congressional 
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committees assign jurisdictions. The result of this assignment, under certain special conditions, is to 
induce an equilibrium outcome that does not otherwise exist. 17 
Constitutional federalism can generate stability in another way. Specifically, by dividing a 
population into a variety of subpopulations, each subpopulation can have a more compact distribution 
of preferences than the whole. Thus, although institutional devices that raise the vote quota may have 
little effect on the population taken as a whole, such devices can generate stability at the local level 
(Result 7). 
We also know, however, that any outcome realized either by dividing issue-jurisdictions or 
populations can be threatened by a relaxation of the rules -- a majority of the population will prefer 
different national outcomes, especially if the assignment of tax liabilities can be placed on the public 
agenda (Results 2, 3 ,  and 8). Thus, barring any long-term disadvantages to doing so, there will always 
exist losers at the local level who will try to nationalize issues and undermine constitutional 
federalism. What remains unclear, then, is why "parchment barriers" might operate in this way -­
why majority coalitions might continue to regard constitutional federalism as a legitimate part of a 
self-enforcing arrangement. 
Thus, consider the issue of reapportionment and notice that in the United States at least, the 
Supreme Court may set general guidelines for acceptable apportionment ("one man one vote"), but the 
national government does not intervene otherwise in such matters - - in accordance with the 
constitution, congressional district boundaries are determined at the state level. That this allocation 
of responsibilities is stabilizing derives from the fact that reapportionment, which redistributes 
political power within a polity, is inherently destabilizing in the social choice theorist's definition. 
But by allowing only general principles to be decided at the national level, this instability is localized 
and does not infect national politics. Moreover, the local losers in these reapportionment decisions 
have no guarantee that they will fare better if the matter is nationalized -- indeed, if the winners take 
care not to wholly threaten the losers with "political elimination," nationalization may threaten greater 
losses. Federalism, then, and the threat of nationalization, moderates the actions of local winning 
coalitions. And thus isolated, this component of redistributive politics cannot complicate the 
determination of general principles of apportionment and society's general coordinative rules. 
17 Bernholz (1986) shows, moreover, that there is a theoretical reason for believing that federalism 
removes some of the instability that social choice theory identifies. Specifically, for any preference 
profile in society, rights to decide between different alternative can be assigned to subsets of society 
in such a way that the society has no dictator or oligarchy, but social preferences are nevertheless 
transitive. Of course, it remains an open question as to whether federalism assigns those right in a 
way that achieves this end. 
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This is not to say that constitutional federalism absolves the national government of all 
redistributive matters. Without appropriate constitutional prohibitions that are difficult to circumvent 
or change, the size and influence of the national government will grow relative to other governmental 
units, thereby increasing the redistributive matters that require national resolution. This process, in 
turn, nationalizes "special interests" and threatens "the decline of the state" of which Olson ( 1982) 
warns. 
In this context, the argument in the preceding section that electoral institutions can yield different 
objective among politicians competing within identical constituencies becomes especially important. 
Madison, et. al. miscalculated on one important matter -- they failed to predict the formation of 
national political parties and in so doing they failed to confront the danger that such parties can 
circumvent a separation of powers and become the basis of a coalition that is transfored into a faction. 
However, our discussion reveals that the members of the same party can have quite different 
objectives, and these differences preclude the development of such a faction. Parliamentary systems 
do not have this safeguard, and their only protection is electoral institutions that create incentives for 
multi-party systems or for parties that are loose coalitions of factions. Federalism, however, provides 
an additional safeguard that many unsuccessful presidential democracies failed to possess. In a 
constitutionally decentralized state in which political competition at governmental sublevels counts 
for something because those sublevels have real resources at their disposal, political parties will 
themselves be decentralized. Local politicians will be as much in competition with national party 
organizations as those sublevels are in competition with the national government. And decentralized 
parties are a poor basis on which to build factions that can circumvent a constitutional separation of 
power. 
For these reasons it is unfortunate that it is probably impossible to establish a federalism that 
forever protects sub-units from the national government unless there are strong coordinating 
incentives to do so. For example, such a situation almost certainly exists in Switzerland since it is 
common knowledge that a unitary state would not long survive in light of that society's linguistic and 
cultural differences (Rabushka and Shepsle 1972). Constitutional federalism survives there because 
it coordinates effectively and no other arrangement is feasible - - it is the logical solution to the 
repeated prisoners' dilemma. In a state such as Taiwan, on the other hand, this federal form would 
most likely erode quickly because erosion is unlikely to be regarded as threatening overall political 
stability, and it would be dangerous to proceed on the assumption that federalism could provide any 
meaningful, long-term guarantee of political stability. Stability must be secured by other means. 
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9. 1860 - Constitutional Failure or Success? 
It is generally assumed that the American Civil War illustrates constitutional instability and the 
singular example of chaotic American constitutional failure. Certainly a half-million battle deaths 
does not appear to mark a constitutional success, but those who accept this view fail to specify what 
would have constituted a success at that time or whether any constitutional arrangement could have 
afforded a better outcome. 
One possibility, of course, would have been the elimination of slavery by peaceful means, 
presumably with the North "buying out" the South's position, using the resources that were otherwise 
spent on executing the war. Few persons would assert that this outcome is not a Pareto improvement 
over what eventually prevailed, but the contemporary theory of the causes of war tells us that such 
a resolution of the dispute was unavailable, regardless of constitutional provisions (see especially 
Blainey 1 973). That the South began the war in the first place and that the North initially engaged 
in the conflict with such arrogance suggest that both sides believed they could win a military victory 
at acceptable cost. The fact that the cost subsequently proved unacceptable is not evidence of 
irrationality or miscalculation, for such are the frailties and limitations of human reason. In any 
event, these divergent perceptions about military and economic capabilities means that a peaceful, 
economic resolution of the conflict that maintained the Union was in all likelihood infeasible. 
An alternative resolution is the peaceful session of the Confederacy from the Union, and the 
continuance of slavery in the South. We cannot say how future generations might have evaluated this 
outcome, but if we ask today whether the eventual elimination of slavery, the passage of the 
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, and subsequent interpretations of that 
amendment were worth the cost, the answer appears to be "yes." 
A final possibility is that the constitution and the political processes it established would have been 
sufficiently flexible to allow for the continued existence of slavery. But if this is what we mean by 
a successful and stable constitution, then it is evident that we do not want our constitutions to be thus 
flexible and stable in all circumstances. Put simply, there are circumstances in which constitutions 
ought to "fail'' and in which such "failures" ought to be construed as successes. If a constitution is 
constructed on a morally corrupt foundation, then success is the eventual destruction of that 
foundation and it merely remains for posterity to decide whether the method of destruction provided 
the most efficient feasible route to that end. That the American constitution attempted to 
accommodate the "peculiar" institution of slavery was its greatest vice, that it failed to do so was its 
singularly greatest success. 
Thus, with perhaps a premonition of events to come, Hamilton uttered words that ought to be kept 
in mind by any modern-day architect of constitutions: 
30 
And as to those mortal feuds, which in certain conjunctures spread a conflaguratiomn through 
a whole nation, or through a very large proportion of it, proceeding either from weighty causes 
of discontent given by government, or from the contagen of some violent popular paroxism, they 
do not fall within the ordinary rules of calculation. When they happen, they commonly amount 
to revolutions and dismemberments of empire. No form of government can always either avoid 
or controul them. It is in vain to hope to guard against events too mighty for human foresight 
and precaution, and it would be idle to object to a government because it could not perform 
impossibilities (ibid #16: 79). 
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